Hastings Law Journal
Volume 66 | Issue 4

5-2015

Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability
Doctrine
Hazel Glenn Beh

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 66 Hastings L.J. 1011 (2015).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol66/iss4/8

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Article 8

O - Beh_17 (EGK) (1) (Do Not Delete)

5/21/2015 12:07 AM

Curing the Infirmities of the
Unconscionability Doctrine
Hazel Glenn Beh*
This Article considers the unconscionability doctrine and confronts criticisms that the
doctrine is fatally flawed as too vague, flexible, and ill-defined. It argues that
unconscionability is a vital contract doctrine that entrusts common law judges with the
latitude and discretion to safeguard essential contracting fairness and justice.
Unconscionability serves as the line of demarcation between hard bargains and unfair
bargains. This Article explores proposals to fortify and invigorate the unconscionability
doctrine in order to promote contracting fairness in an era where one-sided, adhesionary
contracts abound.

* Professor of Law and Co-Director Health Policy Center, William S. Richardson School of
Law, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. I extend my deep appreciation to UC Hastings and Professor
Harry G. Prince for organizing this Symposium to Honor Professor Charles L. Knapp’s 50th Year of
Law Teaching and the Hastings Law Journal for publishing the articles the symposium generated.
Third-year Richardson law student Marissa Agena provided valuable research assistance to me early
in my writing process.
Most importantly, Professor Knapp’s national influence on law school teaching and to the
development of contract law cannot be overstated. Throughout his academic career, his scholarship
has been bold, principled, and relevant. Students and teachers appreciate the clarity, methodology,
and rigor of the widely adopted Knapp, Crystal, and Prince, Problems in Contract Law. I am grateful
for this opportunity to express my gratitude to him for his many contributions to legal academy.
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Introduction
Chuck Knapp has been a staunch defender of unconscionability as a
judicial tool to guard against contracting unfairness, particularly in
1
contracts of adhesion between unequal parties. He and others have
identified the doctrine’s many useful judicial functions. Knapp has
observed that unconscionability serves as a signaling device by which
2
courts identify instances where lawmakers should take corrective action.
Unconscionability also serves as a “safety net,” allowing courts discretion
to refuse enforcement of contracts that exact unfair terms as a result of
3
gross disproportionate economic power on a case-by-case basis.
Unconscionability reveals the demarcation line between hard bargaining
and unfair bargaining, aiding in the development of ethical norms within
4
the marketplace and in transactions facilitated by lawyers. Beyond party

1. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Unconscionability in American Contract Law: A Twenty-FirstCentury Survey, in Commercial Contract Law: A Transatlantic Perspective 309 (Larry A. DiMatteo
et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey]; Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the
Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 609
(2009) [hereinafter Knapp, Blowing the Whistle].
2. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle, supra note 1, at 613–14.
3. Id.; see also Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 Ala. L.
Rev. 73, 74 (2006) (arguing that accepting flexibility within the unconscionability doctrine allows courts to
protect contracting fairness).
4. Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 361, 371–72 (2002) (describing
how a discussion of ethics and law with a client can promote morally informed business decisions);
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disputes, unconscionability has revealed itself as a galvanizing “judicial
counterweight” to arbitration laws that favor the economically powerful
6
and so might be emblematic of a new common law era.
However, for all its promise, the limitations of the unconscionability
7
doctrine are widely acknowledged, and these modulate its policing power.
First, the hammer of unconscionability rarely changes bargaining behaviors,
8
particularly among institutional repeat players. Statutory regimes that
regulate and sanction notorious industries or practices are better suited
9
to wipe out industry-wide predatory behavior. Arthur Leff, whose early
writings had a strong influence on the development of the unconscionability
doctrine, once characterized the doctrine’s capacity to impact mass business
practices as nothing more than trivial, calling it simply “case-by-case
10
sniping.”
Second, when unconscionability is raised, it rarely succeeds because
11
of countervailing values that favor contract enforcement. Contract law’s
infatuation with formalism, freedom of contract, and the burden of proof
necessary to prove unconscionability are so formidable that the doctrine
12
might be characterized as ineffective.

Gregory M. Duhl, The Ethics of Contract Drafting, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 989, 1030 (2010)
(“[C]ontract law . . . should help define the ethical rules for attorneys in the contract-drafting context.”).
5. Summarizing lower court decisions to work around the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration
decisions that diminish the role of the courts in contract disputes, Knapp describes this galvanization:
By invoking the rhetoric of unconscionability, these judges are not merely acting tactically
in a game of legal chess—although they may be doing that as well—they are sending a
message, not just to the U.S. Supreme Court, but to the other officials and institutions that
collectively make up our legal system.
Knapp, Blowing the Whistle, supra note 1, at 628.
6. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 757, 763–64 (2004).
7. E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law during the 1980’s: The Top Ten, 41 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 203, 222–23 (1990) (characterizing unconscionability as a weak doctrine suffering
“arrested development”).
8. See infra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
9. In critiquing unconscionability, Leff pointed out that case-by-case litigation would do little to
change a business practice. Instead, at best, businesses might alter contracts to get around court
pronouncements. In an even more vitriolic attack on unconscionability than in The Emperor’s New
Clause, discussed infra note 13, he wrote, “[w]ouldn’t more be changed by explicit positive law,
administratively interpreted and enforced, than . . . feed-back from easily distinguishable, easily
stallable, exceedingly expenses cases?” Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers
and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349, 357 (1970).
10. Id. at 358 (“One does not cure any serious breakdown in a theoretically competitive market
system by case-to-case sniping, but one doesn’t do much harm either.”).
11. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1067, 1098–99 (2006) (finding empirical
support for the hypothesis that unconscionability claims seldom succeed).
12. See Stempel, supra note 6, at 840–41 (describing the current status of unconscionability as “a
disfavored stepchild of contract law” that judges should apply “only in the most extreme cases”).
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Third, even when an unconscionability defense prevails, the
remedies are meager. Although unconscionability is aimed at ferreting
13
out, in Leff’s words, “naughty” bargaining and its “resulting evil,” there
are no attending sanctions that fortify the doctrine. Still worse, although
the doctrine is aimed at bad behavior wreaking evil consequences, the
legal profession itself implicitly condones such behavior, stopping short
of prohibiting the insertion of unconscionable provisions in contracts,
14
under the laws governing the legal profession.
Judicial timidity also plagues unconscionability; in fact, that may be
the root of the doctrine’s infirmities. Aside from its use in recent arbitration
cases, judges historically have not favored the doctrine, even in an era where
consumer-targeted adhesionary standard form contracts abound. E.
Allan Farnsworth described unconscionability’s “arrested development”
and short-lived promise as one of the “top ten” developments of contract
15
law in the 1980s. Farnsworth observed that statutory regimes displaced the
common law conception of unconscionability in the consumer arena and
16
it proved an unremarkable doctrine to govern commercial transactions.
Lamentably, unconscionability apparently did not even have an effect on
17
an errant litigant in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture. In the wake
of that case, student author Eben Colby found that the furniture store
continued to “‘push[] the envelope’ of legal contracts, repeatedly making
18
slight changes to their contracts so as to stay one step ahead of the courts.”
Even so weakened, unconscionability’s detractors still regard it as a
19
dangerous and destructive force in contract law. As Jeff Stempel observed,
“many scholars have suggested that unconscionability is simply too
plastic a concept that permits too much post-hoc judicial meddling with
20
contracts.” In the eyes of critics, unconscionability, in the guise of fairness,
allows judges too much latitude to substitute the ends they desire for the
free will of the parties. After its promising beginning, Stempel attributed
unconscionability’s now diminished state to a confluence of five factors

13. In his seminal article, Leff described the dual aspects of unconscionability—procedural and
substantive—as two “legitimate” interests of contract law, “bargaining naughtiness as ‘procedural
unconscionability,’ and . . . the resulting contract as ‘substantive unconscionability.’” Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 487 (1967).
14. See Part I.A.2.
15. Farnsworth, supra note 7, at 222–23.
16. Id.
17. Student author Eben Colby examined the aftermath of the landmark Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). He pessimistically concluded that the case had little effect on
the business practices of the furniture store. Eben Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability
Do to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 625, 656–60 (2002). He noted that WalkerThomas continued to relentlessly pursue writs of replevin against defaulting customers as a lesson to other
customers. Id.
18. Colby, supra note 17, at 660.
19. See Stempel, supra note 6, at 763.
20. Id.
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within law, politics, and society. Stempel asserted that unconscionability’s
disfavor can be blamed on “an academic assault” on the doctrine that
characterized it as amorphous and standardless, together with a return to
a “textualist, formalist version of classical contract interpretation,” the
ascendancy of the law and economics movement, a political and societal
tide of distrust of law and litigation, and a particular revulsion for
21
excessive judicial discretion and activism.
The unconscionability doctrine nevertheless “survives to protect . . .
22
fairness norms” and to serve as a last-ditch judicial “safety net to catch
23
cases of contractual injustice.” Part I of this Article discusses
unconscionability’s functions and exposes several of the doctrine’s
weaknesses in the service of contracting fairness. Part II explores
suggestions advanced by several contract scholars to judicially fine-tune
the unconscionability doctrine to better enable it to fulfill its purpose.
Most of these are within the grasp of a determined common law judge.
For example, to make unconscionability more vital and robust, more
courts might follow those few courts that entertain unconscionability as
an affirmative claim that can be brought by a victim, as well as an
affirmative defense. At the very least, in appropriate cases, courts might
consider a broader range of equitable remedies in addition to
nonenforcement, and particularly, allow declaratory relief and
restitution. Expanding the range of remedies afforded to victims
recognizes that unconscionability can cause financial harm that cannot be
adequately compensated by mere nonenforcement. The exposure to an
award of damages, even simple restitution, or attorneys’ fees may be
needed when the unconscionable term has caused the victim to incur
loss. Moreover, the threat of real damages may also deter
unconscionable actors.
Next, courts should acknowledge that unconscionability is close kin
to illegality. Like other forms of illegality, unconscionable contracts,
particularly adhesionary form contracts, have negative impacts beyond

21. Id. at 813. Leff’s seminal critique of unconscionability provided a persuasive cautionary
narrative that any strong form of unconscionability threatened freedom of contract and amounted to
unwelcome judicial meddling in private agreements. See generally Leff, supra note 13. Stempel observed
that Leff’s article has been widely cited in law review articles, judicial opinions, and law school texts.
He surmised, “Although Leff did not eradicate the unconscionability norm, he clearly cut it down to
size, both in the academy and, I posit, the courts.” Stempel, supra note 6, at 818. Stempel also observed
that unconscionability withered under a “resurgence of classical contract law, textualism, and formalism”
at work in the law of contracts by the 1970s and ’80s that were “inhospitable to unconscionability.” Id. at
821–22. The dominating influence of “law and economics” in contract law contributed to unconscionability’s
fall as well. Adherents assert that the quest for efficiency means that marketplace actors left to their own
devices will create mutually beneficial contracts, without judicial intermeddling. Id. at 823–24. Finally,
political animosity toward both “judicial activism” and against litigation more generally all contributed to
unconscionability’s decline. Id. at 827–29.
22. Schmitz, supra note 3, at 74.
23. Id.
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the parties. Pervasive unconscionability undermines basic principles of
contract law and exacts social harm by “undermin[ing] our system of
24
contract enforcement.” Therefore, in appropriate cases, courts might
liberally fashion remedies to deter future unconscionability. To further
strengthen the doctrine, courts must acknowledge that they hold an
25
inherent power to raise unconscionability sua sponte.
Most importantly, courts must embrace unconscionability for the
flexible standard that it was intended to be, and recognize it as a doctrine
intended to police and define the essence of bargaining fairness. Recent
arbitration cases reveal that unconscionability can be a robust common
law doctrine that insists upon contracting fairness and justice.
Unconscionability’s vagueness and flexibility do not endanger contract
law; instead, like good faith and fair dealing, unconscionability is a standard
of essential contracting fairness that has been entrusted to the common law.

I. Unconscionability’s Infirmities
This Part considers aspects of unconscionability as now constructed
that diminish it as a policing doctrine in disputes between weaker and
stronger parties, where the advantaged party may have exacted unfair terms
by heavy-handed means. As a preliminary matter, because it is a common
law device for deciding single cases, the unconscionability doctrine cannot
be expected to be as effective as legislation to eradicate unfair business
practices that permeate specific industries. However, unconscionability can
serve as a sentry to call lawmakers to action to legislate and regulate
against systemic abuses. Additionally, unconscionability remains vital even
when regulatory schemes are implemented. First, regulations will never
be able to fully account for evolving contracting practices. In addition,
statutes often utilize the concept of unconscionability to define prohibited
26
conduct. But, unconscionability misses its normative potential even as a
common law doctrine because it is a weak signaling device, both to the
legislature and to players in the marketplace.

24. Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural Unconscionability,
34 Cumb. L. Rev. 11, 14 (2003).
25. See infra notes 155–158 and accompanying text.
26. Unconscionability, as a standard of fairness, has a life beyond its common law roots. For all
the criticism of unconscionability as a vague common law doctrine, it has developed as a statutory
standard as well. For example, consumer protection statutes often prohibit “unconscionable” behavior
or contracting. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 501.204 (2015) (Florida’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Act prohibits unconscionable practices or acts); see also Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement
of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1903, 1928–49 (2013) (providing a
50 state survey which notes that Idaho, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oklahoma each
prohibit unconscionable practices under the state’s deceptive trade practice acts).
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A. Unconscionability as a Faint Clarion Call
The adjudication of unconscionability claims (whether successful or
not) can serve as a signaling device—an expression by litigants and
judges that legislation is needed to correct bargaining abuses. The saga of
franchising illustrates how common law courts refereeing claims of
unconscionability might signal to lawmakers that a legislative “fix” is in
order. Franchises proliferated as a contractual business relationship after
27
World War II. Disputes have abounded because of the great disparity in
economic power and information between franchisees and franchisors.
Early cases, litigated under the common law, revealed that the common
law judge could do little to police this business relationship; nevertheless,
the volume of cases filed and judicial decisions issued were part of the
28
stimulus for a legislative response.
Four general observations about franchising and unconscionability
are noteworthy. First, the franchisor-franchisee relationship is typically
grossly unequal. The franchisor is often a mega-corporation that markets
ubiquitous products such as fast food, clothing, or gasoline, and typically
possesses vastly more economic power, information, and sophistication
than the aspiring franchisee. The powerful franchisor drafts a one-sided,
29
nonnegotiable agreement and presents it to the prospective franchisee.
The franchisees, on the other hand, “typically, but not always, are small
businessmen or businesswomen . . . seeking to make the transition from
30
being wage earners and for whom the franchise is their very first business.”
31
As a result, franchisees have little bargaining power or inside information.
Second, franchises sprang up largely unregulated, and these enterprises
continue in a lightly regulated milieu, where disclosure requirements are

27. Franchises today represent 3.5% of the gross domestic product. IHS Global Insight, Int’l
Franchise Ass’n, Franchise Business Economic Outlook for 2014, at 19 (2014), available at
http://franchiseeconomy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Franchise_Business_Outlook_January_2014-113-13.pdf.
28. Franchising arose as an innovative, dynamic marketing and distribution model in the post-World
War II era. See Boyd Allan Byers, Note, Making a Case for Federal Regulation of Franchise Terminations—
A Return-of-Equity Approach, 19 J. Corp. L. 607, 614–15 (1994) (describing rise of franchising as a
dominant business retail distribution model). Franchising is a poster child for Ian Macneil’s “relational
contract.” See generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978); Ian R. Macneil,
Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 483. In simple terms, a franchisor,
by contract, grants a franchisee a right to distribute its product and/or to use its business format for their
mutual profit and benefit. Product distribution franchises authorize the franchisee to distribute the
franchisor’s product, while a business format franchise allows the franchisee to “replicate the franchisor’s
successful business formula at the franchised location.” Byers, supra, at 613–14.
29. See Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship,
109 Penn St. L. Rev. 105, 125–27 (2004) (describing inequalities generally).
30. Id. at 107 (quoting Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sue Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373 (Ct. App. 1996)).
31. Id.
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more common than more heavy-handed regulations. Third, the history
of franchises is checkered at best. As one commentator described its
unregulated roots, “[f]ranchising became a jungle, where jungle law
33
ruled” and “fraud prevailed.” Finally, although franchisors and franchisees
each benefit from their mutual success, their interests are imperfectly
34
aligned throughout the life of the contract.
In the largely lawless era of the 1960s and 1970s, contract law
provided the playbook by which to resolve disputes arising out of this
economically complex, conflicted, and unequal relationship. Even today,
despite an increase in state and federal regulation, contract law remains
35
important to moderate franchise disputes. At first blush, one might
conclude that normative principles of contract law embodied in standards
such as unconscionability and good faith and fair dealing, are well suited
to police abusive franchisors. But contract doctrines available to judges
slogging case-by-case, clause-by-clause, and industry-by-industry, have
proven inadequate, either to right injustice in individual cases or to correct
widespread fairness issues that afflict these far reaching enterprises.
The early case of Division of the Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil
36
Corporation illustrates the twin failings of contract law—both to fix
industry-wide oppressive dealings and to achieve justice in a single case.
In the end, it shows how courts can surrender with a plea to lawmakers to
take over. Triple T involved Mobil Oil’s unilateral termination of a gas
station franchise agreement pursuant to the franchise agreement, despite the
37
franchisee’s successful operation of the station without breach of contract.
Triple T, the franchisee, had operated a Mobil Oil station for six years
under a “standard form” lease and franchise agreement that was “common
38
to the industry.” Mobil Oil unilaterally invoked the termination provisions
that allowed it to terminate the franchise, with ninety-days notice, without

32. Byers, supra note 28, at 623–24 (describing Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) disclosure
regime and patchwork of industry-specific or general state franchise laws that provide some substantive
regulation during the franchise).
33. Howard Yale Lederman, Franchising and Franchise Law, 92 Mich. B.J. 34, 35 (2013).
34. Interests are not aligned during the formation stage. An imbalance of information, economic
power, and sophistication provide a fertile field for fraud, misrepresentation, and the inclusion of onesided terms. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 29, at 125, 174 (describing pre-sale conflicts). During the
life of the franchise, interests are not aligned, for example, regarding the scope of the franchisee’s territory. A
franchisor may benefit from encroaching into the franchisees territory in order to maximize its own
profits at the expense of the franchisee. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories: A Community
Standard, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 779, 782–83 (2010). Franchise disputes arise at termination over the
grounds for terminating and methodology of untangling the business interests. See generally Steinberg,
& Lescatre, supra note 29 (describing disputes from the start to conclusion of the franchise relationship).
35. See generally Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 29 (describing friction points in relationship in
the pre-sale negotiations, post-sales relationship, and termination process).
36. 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (App. Div. 1969).
37. Id. at 194.
38. Id.
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cause. For its six-year efforts operating the Mobil franchise, all Triple T
was to receive at termination was the return of its security deposit under
39
the lease. Mobil purportedly had a desire to upgrade the property’s use
to a diagnostic and repair service center, as opposed to the franchisee’s
40
more basic service station. Among other claims, the franchisee asserted
that the termination provision was unconscionable and that terminating
without cause violated the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing
found in every contract. The court, with some acknowledged regret,
rejected both claims. As to invoking the one-sided termination provision,
the court honored freedom of contract principles over fairness, explaining
that “[e]very man is presumed to be capable of managing his own affairs,
and whether his bargains are wise or unwise, is not ordinarily a legitimate
41
subject of inquiry.” It thus refused to inject good faith into an expressly
at-will termination clause because doing so would contradict the agreement.
As to the alleged unconscionability of the agreement, the court explained
that the termination provision was not so inherently unfair as to be
unconscionable, in part because it conformed to commercial reasonableness
42
at least under some circumstances.
Taking note of the failure of federal and state legislative efforts to
regulate these agreements, the court concluded with a plea to lawmakers:
The Court is not unsympathetic to plaintiff’s plight but ‘(s)tability of
contract obligations must not be undermined by judicial sympathy.’ It has
been the sacredness of contractual obligations which has prevented courts
of equity from imposing justice in many circumstances. Nevertheless, it is
anticipated that ameliorative legislation covering business distributorships
will shortly be a reality and perhaps this very case may provide the
stimulus necessary [for] enactment. Copies of the opinion shall be sent
the appropriate legislative committees. The Court cannot legislate and
is constrained to grant defendant’s motion and deny plaintiff’s motion
43
despite the apparent inequities.

Bowing at the altar of freedom of contract, the court sacrificed
unconscionability and good faith and fair dealing. In doing so, the court
surrendered, conceding itself not up to the task of refereeing contracts
between grossly unequal parties.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 198.
42. Id. The court’s construction of unconscionability required a showing of substantive
unconscionability prior to any inquiry into procedural unfairness. Id. at 201.
43. Id. at 204 (citations omitted). Not all courts followed this view; some demanded good faith
even in an at-will termination case. See, e.g., B.E. deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099,
1100 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying South Carolina law and holding an at-will termination of a franchise
may not be for an “unconscionable reason” or “contrary to equity and good conscience”); TeleControls, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 388 F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1967) (applying Oregon law and holding a
termination of franchise must be in good faith).
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Congress and state legislatures received the message from the courts
and the victims of unfair franchise agreements and began to impose some
regulations aimed at fairness, yet these efforts have proved inadequate as
44
well. Today, franchising is regulated through federal regulation and a
45
patchwork of state regulation. The regulation of franchises remains spotty;
laws are typically directed at mandatory disclosures or targeted at
46
particular industries. Only a few states have specific laws that regulate
47
the ongoing relationship and termination. Therefore, franchisees continue
to rely upon the common law doctrines of unconscionability and good faith
48
and fair dealing to fill gaps and referee disputes. Although franchise
agreements typically heavily favor the franchisor, in tallying the outcomes
of unconscionability claims, one commentator noted how inadequate the
unconscionability doctrine has been:
Provisions of the franchise agreement are rarely truly unconscionable.
Courts are unlikely to find express termination provisions
unconscionable—even when they permit termination without cause—
because the franchise is between business persons and because the
parties enter the agreement on their own volition. Unconscionability
doctrine is therefore ill-suited to deal with fairness issues in the
49
ongoing franchise relationship.

As commentators have complained, unfairness continues to plague the
franchise industry and “there is regulatory inaction and constraints on the
50
ability to rectify the abuses permitted under contracts of adhesion.”
Because contract litigation has proven so ineffective to police franchises,
there remains a push by franchisees to strengthen regulatory oversight of
franchise agreements, and a resignation to the inadequacy of contract law’s
51
policing doctrines. The franchise saga reveals that neither legislation nor
44. See FTC Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (2015).
45. See Byers, supra note 28, at 622–33 (describing federal and state franchise laws).
46. See id. at 626–37 (discussing federal laws targeting automobile and petroleum franchises, and
state laws targeting the same, as well as “an array of industries”).
47. Id. at 624–26.
48. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 34, at 820–21.
49. Byers, supra note 28, at 635. The commentator’s views on the effectiveness of good faith and
fair dealing are similar, although he notes some success under state constructions of good faith.
However, reviewing the doctrine’s overall effectiveness in overseeing termination disputes, the author
comments, “[t]he franchisor may thus by careful drafting circumvent this implied covenant by explicitly
setting forth in the franchise agreement the right to terminate without cause.” Id. at 633; see also Steinberg &
Lescatre, supra note 29, at 112–14 (arguing for stronger federal regulation of franchises, complaining that
the American judicial conceptualization of good faith is “too narrow” and “judicial or arbitral application
of equitable principles” as “insufficient” to account for “the consequences of opportunistic behavior”).
50. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 29, at 107.
51. See generally Byers, supra note 28 (calling for federal regulation in franchise terminations);
Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 29, at 314 (calling for strengthened federal regulation of franchises).
Good faith and fair dealing does not adequately oversee the franchise relationship, as shown in Triple T,
where the court showed reluctance to override the express terms of the contract with an implied term of
good faith. See Byers, supra note 28, at 632–33. Unconscionability is ineffective because, although a
provision may have an unfair result, there is a presumption of assent to the term. Id. at 635.
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the common law alone can tame sharp business practices; and even
52
together they may prove ineffective.
B. Unconscionability’s Withered Normative Influence
This Subpart discusses some impediments to unconscionability as a
normative device to affect future behavior. First, unconscionability is widely
construed as an affirmative defense only; and its remedy limited to
nonenforcement. Second, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
does not preclude or even discourage a lawyer’s inclusion of
unconscionable clauses in contracts as a matter of basic professional
conduct. Third, unlike the illegality doctrine, where courts often consider
the effect on other parties and future contracting behavior in fashioning
a remedy, this deterrent concept appears less developed in
unconscionability.
To the extent that unconscionability is aimed at identifying and
correcting bad bargaining behavior that achieves undesirable ends, this
Subpart asks why unconscionability has lacked the might to eradicate
Leff’s “naughtiness” and resulting “evil.” One must remember that
contract transactions are largely self-regulated, so any normative effect
unconscionability has in the marketplace must be as a deterrent. As the
Knapp, Crystal, and Prince first year contracts text reminds us:
On any given day, the number of individual contracts entered into in
even one of the United States must number in the millions. Of that
huge total, a tiny fraction—but still a large number, in absolute terms—
will eventually give rise to a dispute between the parties. Of these
relatively few disputes, the overwhelming majority will be resolved
without even coming to the threshold of a court, much less to judgment
53
or a decision on appeal.

52. Grant Gilmore observed a rise of statutory regimes in the 1950s and warned of the difficulties
this trend brings, commenting:
We are just beginning to face up to the consequences of this orgy of statute making. One of
the facts of legislative life . . . is that getting a statue enacted in the first place is much easier
than getting the statute revised so that it will make sense in light of changed conditions.
Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 86 (1977). He continued, explaining that once statutes
take over a subject, courts take on a limited role. Id. at 97 (“Once the legislature has taken over a field,
only the legislature can effect any further change.”). Even when the statute fails, the assumption is that “a
court must bow to the legislative command, however absurd, however unjust, however wicked.” Id.
Newer consumer issues, such as subprime mortgages, see Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of
Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1035
(2010), and payday lending, see Sarah Howard Jenkins, Fringe Economy Lending and Other Aberrant
Contracts: Introduction, 89 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3 (2014), demonstrate that, as with franchise agreements,
there will always be a role for both legislation and judicial oversight where there is a gross imbalance of
contracting power.
53. Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal, & Harry G. Prince, Problems in Contract Law:
Cases and Materials 16–17 (7th ed. 2012).
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Since judicial oversight of contracting is the exception, rather than the rule,
whatever normative pressure the judicial construction of unconscionability
can infuse into the contracting process must derive from the possibility
that an adverse judicial decision or other sanction is not worth the risk, even
knowing that few contracts are subjected to litigation. Yet unconscionability
poses only a small threat to the more powerful contracting party because,
as a rule, its remedies are feeble and there are few consequences to
unconscionable actors and their lawyers.
1.

Meager Remedies

The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts each provide for some form of nonenforcement
when a contract or term is unconscionable, but are not clear that
nonenforcement represents an expansion or a limitation on remedial
action. Under U.C.C. section 2-302 and Restatement (Second) section
208, when a court determines that a contract or a clause within a contract
is unconscionable, the court is empowered to “refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
54
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.” Nothing
explicitly precludes other remedies.
Because the U.C.C. and the Restatement affirmatively grant courts
these nonenforcement powers, most courts interpret these powers
55
narrowly, taking the view that unconscionability is only defensive and
equitable, and that the only remedy available to those harmed by an
unconscionable provision or contract is nonenforcement of the contract,
56
in whole or in part. Agreeing with this restrictive reading, Farnsworth
54. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981).
55. This is considered the majority position. See 1 William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial
Code Series § 2-302:5 (2013) (“[M]ost courts have found that Section 2-302 does not provide authority
to award damages for use of an unconscionable contract or clause.”).
56. Courts, for the most part, have accepted that unconscionability is purely defensive and cannot
be used as an action for damages. See, e.g., Cowin Equip. Co., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 734 F.2d
1581, 1582 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that unconscionability is defensive and equitable, and “the cases
which have addressed the issue have consistently rejected the theory that damages may be collected
for an unconscionable contract provision, citing the language of § 2-302 and its common law precursor
to demonstrate that § 2-302 was not intended to provide a basis for damage recovery”); Hunter v.
Sterling Bank, Inc., No. 09–172 (FLW), 2011 WL 5921388 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2011) (dismissing
unconscionability claim where plaintiffs sought damages against mortgage broker); see also Givens v.
Rent-A-Center, 720 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D. Ala. 1988) (“[D]amages are not recoverable under a
theory of unconscionability.”); Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust 2001-4, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16
(2006) (holding that on a finding of unconscionability courts do not grant restitution or money damages but
are limited to refusing enforcement). Langemeier v. Nat’l Oats, Inc., 775 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1985), is a
noteworthy exception. There, the lower court raised the unconscionability doctrine sua sponte in a
commercial sales contract for the purchase of popcorn. Id. at 976. The lower court then found a clause
that allowed the buyer to reject the popcorn unilaterally unconscionable and refused its enforcement. Id.
As a result of refusing enforcement, the court awarded expectation damages to the seller that amounted
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explained, “[b]ecause the remedies for unconscionability are cast in
terms of withholding relief instead of avoidance, there is no inherent
requirement that the claimant make restitution, as the claimant must in
57
the case of avoidance for misrepresentation or duress.”
The judicial view that equitable remedies other than
58
nonenforcement are precluded weakens the doctrine immeasurably.
Many courts that steadfastly hold that nonenforcement is the only
59
remedy for unconscionability allow illogical results, and this view
renders unconscionability worthless against dominant parties who have
60
already obtained their ill-gotten benefits.
However, Harry G. Prince called this narrow reading a “fallacious
61
62
view” based upon a “simplistic reading” of U.C.C. section 2-302 that
produces illogical results. He pointed out that the actual language of section
2-302 does not insist that unconscionability be merely defensive. He
explained:
The distinction between defensive and offensive use is illogical and
should be discarded because it may well result in only one of two similarly
situated parties being unable to make use of the unconscionability
doctrine. For example, if two parties purchase appliances from door-todoor salespersons for outrageously and indefensibly exorbitant prices
to “the difference between the contract price and the amount received.” Id. Thus, by striking the clause,
the court awarded damages for breach of contract.
57. E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.28, at 596 (3d ed. 2004); see also
Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari & Perillo on Contracts § 9.39, at 338 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that although an
increasing judicial willingness to reform unconscionable contracts, unequivocally stating, “unconscionability
does not create a cause of action for damages”). But see James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code § 5-8, at 237–38 (6th ed. 2010). James White and Robert Summers asserted that 2302 does not limit courts to nonenforcement merely by expressly providing for nonenforcement
remedies. Id. White and Summers also alluded to “as yet undeveloped possibilities for other remedies such
as injunction and punitive damages.” Id. § 5-3, at 221.
58. Compare Camp v. Telco Ala. Credit Union, No. 2:12–cv–2237–LSC, 2013 WL 2106727 (N.D.
Ala. May 13, 2013) (refusing to recognize a cause of action for declaratory relief “because unconscionability
is merely an affirmative defense, there is no actual controversy between the parties, and a
declaratory judgment would not be appropriate”); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.
Fla. 1979) (unconscionability does not allow affirmative recovery of money damages or restitution);
Alboyacian v. BP Prods. N. Am., Civ. No. 9–5143, 2011 WL 5873039 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011) (dismissing
unconscionability count where plaintiffs sought injunction to prevent termination of an allegedly
unconscionable franchise termination provision); Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 714 P.2d 1049 (Or. Ct.
App. 1986) (unconscionability is not a basis for affirmative relief), with In re Checking Overdraft
Litigation, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (allowing the claim for declaratory relief and
return of funds on a claim of unconscionability in a case where the bank retained (rather than sued for
collection) the customer’s money as an overdraft penalty so that without a declaratory action “the
customer never has the opportunity to raise unconscionability as a defense for nonpayment”).
59. See Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency,
46 Hastings L.J. 459, 548 (1995) (“The ‘defensive use only’ rule is artificial, is based on a simplistic reading
of Section 2-302, and does not effectively administer the policy underlying the unconscionability concept.”).
60. See Best, 714 P.2d at 1055–56 (citing cases and denying restitution on the grounds that the
contract terms allowing excessive charges to bank’s customers was unconscionable).
61. Prince, supra note 59, at 545.
62. Id. at 548.
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as a result of sharp dealing, the party who purchases on credit can refuse
to pay and then use the unconscionability doctrine defensively to fend
off a claim by the seller for payment. The party who has cash and is able
to pay on delivery cannot use unconscionability to obtain a partial refund
of the price or to rescind the transaction altogether under the approach
63
that blindly denies affirmative relief on a claim of unconscionability.

When U.C.C. section 2-302 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
section 208 are interpreted to limit the outcome of unconscionability to
nonenforcement and to preclude other remedies, particularly restitution,
unconscionability packs little punch.
Some courts have adopted a less constrained position, following the
general rubric that affirmative defenses, including unconscionability, can
64
be raised through declaratory relief and that restitution might be sought.
As one court explained in a case involving an unconscionable home loan,
if declaratory relief, restitution, and reformation are unavailable, the
result could constitute its own form of unconscionability:
Thus, the Court finds that unconscionability may be an affirmative
claim if pleaded correctly. To find otherwise would be to hold that a
party who has entered into an unconscionable contract would have to
breach it, get sued, and raise unconscionability as a defense before the
Court may examine the enforceability of the contract. Moreover, in the
event that the defense of unconscionability is unsuccessful, then the
losing party is left to deal with the consequences of the breach which,
in this case, may be a monetary judgment in addition to the loss of the
home to foreclosure. The ability of the party suspecting unconscionability
to raise that issue in a declaratory judgment action or in an action for
reformation permits the party to both comply with the contract as
written, thus avoiding the consequences of a breach, and still obtain a
declaration as to the enforceability of the contract. In this Court’s
65
opinion, the law favors the latter.

63. Id. at 485–86.
64. In re Checking Overdraft Litigation, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2010), recognized that it
was defying traditional limitations in its holding that would allow it to declare a term unconscionable
and then to award restitution:
Finally, Defendants appear to be correct in their assertion that, ordinarily, unconscionability
is properly asserted as a defense to a contract rather than an affirmative cause of action. But
this is not the ordinary case. An ordinary case in this factual context would be one in which
the customer allegedly overdraws his or her account, the bank provides the overdraft service,
and then the bank demands payment of the overdraft fee from the customer. Then, when the
customer refuses to pay, the bank sues the customer for breach of contract, and the customer
at that time can raise an unconscionability defense to the enforcement of the contract. In the
instant case, however, the bank is never required to file suit because it is already in possession
of the customer’s money, and simply collects the fee by debiting the customer’s account. Thus,
the customer never has the opportunity to raise unconscionability as a defense for nonpayment.
The only opportunity to do so is through a lawsuit filed by the customer, after payment has
been made. Hence, the facts of the instant case weigh in favor of permitting Plaintiffs to pursue
an unconscionability claim.
Id. at 1318–19.
65. Eva v. Midwest Nat’l Mortg. Banc, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 862, 896–97 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
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If a court construes unconscionability to allow only prospective
nonenforcement, victims may lose, even if they establish
unconscionability. For example, without a broad range of equitable
remedies, a victim who overpays under an unconscionable term has no
66
means to get the overpayment returned. If the victim is not sued
affirmatively for default, she may not be able to reform the contract or
67
obtain declaratory relief to avoid an unconscionable provision.
Notably, neither the Restatement nor the U.C.C. expressly limits
unconscionability’s remedy to nonenforcement. Courts simplistically infer
this limitation from the fact that the U.C.C. and the Restatement
specifically allow judicial discretion to choose among nonenforcement
68
remedies. The Restatement does not state that unconscionability is
exclusively defensive. The Restatement commentary notes that a defensive
remedial role for unconscionability is the “simplest application” and the
69
“appropriate remedy . . . ordinarily.” This language is not necessarily
restrictive and instead might be viewed as expanding a judge’s discretionary
authority to include nonenforcement. The implication of the commentary is
most certainly that nonenforcement may be the “simplest application” but
leaves open the possibility of other remedies in appropriate circumstances.
2.

It Is Not Unethical for Lawyers to Assist Clients in Imposing an
Unconscionable Term

One might hope that as a society we believe that the fairness values
that undergird unconscionability ought to be present in every contract.
However, the law governing attorney conduct undermines that premise
by narrowly fixating on the lawyer’s obligation to avoid affirmative fraud
66. Consider Jones v. Star Credit, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969), in which a price term was held
to be unconscionable. Although the court allowed reformation of the contract on a suit brought by the
buyer, by the time the buyers filed suit for reformation, they had paid $619.88 and had a balance of
$819.81 for the purchase of a freezer with a retail value of about $300. Id. at 265. Without an order for
restitution, Star Credit could retain its ill-gotten gain.
67. The Walker-Thomas Furniture lawsuit, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), reveals the problem
with an exclusive nonenforcement remedy. At the end of the lawsuit, Williams and Thorne, the debtors,
could only achieve the damages they deserved by way of court-approved settlement. The lawsuit was
filed in 1963 and finally concluded in 1967. Had the suit concluded without settlement, nonenforcement of
the unconscionable clause and the resulting replevin might only have allowed the defendants to reclaim
their purchased items. As one of the attorneys explained in 1968:
[t]he idea of compromise and settlement inevitably arose before the cases came to trial. Ora
Lee Williams and the Thornes had gradually been able to replace the items seized from them
in 1963 and were not interested in having them returned. In both cases the defendants were
paid what was considered the reasonable value of the seized items after being used by the
defendants prior to the replevin by plaintiff.
Pierre E. Dostert, Appellate Restatement of Unconscionability: Civil Legal Aid at Work, 54 A.B.A. J. 1183,
1186 (1968).
68. Another way to interpret this positive grant of discretion not to enforce the provision is that
without it, courts would not have discretion to cherry pick what they would strike within a contract.
69. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. g (1981).
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and deceit rather than providing a code of conduct that challenges lawyers
not to be instruments of unconscionable contracting. The American Bar
Association’s (“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional Conduct largely
70
guide the conduct of lawyers in the United States. The Model Rules are
highly protective of the ideal of zealous advocacy and the adversary
system. As one commentator observed, “[t]hese Rules assume the primacy
of the adversarial system for reaching the truth and rendering justice, and
71
merely set an essentially amoral floor for attorney professionalism.”
72
“Myopically” “client-centered” in regulating transactional practice, the
Rules prohibit a lawyer’s participation in affirmative fraud and some
73
conduct that borders on fraud. Model Rule 1.2(d) provides that a
lawyer may not counsel or assist a client to engage in fraudulent or
74
criminal conduct. Rule 4.1 demands that lawyers be truthful to others
75
when acting on behalf of clients, but limits disclosure responsibilities
76
unless it is “necessary to avoid a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.”
And finally, Rule 8.4(c) broadly prohibits conduct involving “dishonesty,
77
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”
There is little within the professional code to prohibit lawyers from
participating in the drafting of unfair, oppressive, and one-sided contract
78
provisions without more. In fact, the Hazard and Hodes treatise, The

70. The American Bar Association tallies state adoptions of the Model Rules. California is the only
state that has not adopted “the format” of the Model Rules. Am. Bar Assoc. CPR Policy Implementation
Comm., State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Comments 6 n.1 (2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments.authcheckdam.pdf. However,
many states have customized either the rules or the commentary within their jurisdiction. See
Christopher M. Fairman, Protecting Consumers: Attorney Ethics and the Law Governing Lawyers,
60 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 529, 529–30 (2006); Amy J. Schmitz, Ethical Considerations in Drafting
and Enforcing Consumer Arbitration Clauses, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev. 841, 847 (2008).
71. Schmitz, supra note 70, at 847.
72. Id. at 849.
73. The Rules provide that it is misconduct to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation.” The Rules further prohibit counseling or assisting a client to engage in fraudulent
or criminal conduct. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1.2(d) (2013). Rule 4.1 requires lawyers to be
truthful to others when acting on behalf of a client, but stops short of demanding disclosure, unless it is
“necessary to avoid criminal or fraudulent act by a client.” See generally Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of
Invalid and “Iffy” Contract Clauses, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 487 (2006).
74. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) (2013).
75. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1(a) (2013).
76. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1(b) (2013).
77. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(c) (2013).
78. See Kunz, supra note 73, at 488 (observing that ethical guidance for lawyers with regard to
transactions is “thin”). Notably, some state statutes prohibit the inclusion of unconscionable terms, in
some contexts. For example, California’s Consumer’s Legal Remedies Act prohibits inclusion of
unconscionable provisions in consumer contracts. Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(19) (West 2014). See David
Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 605,
663 (2010) (explaining that Florida and California consumer statutes provide for affirmative remedies
against unconscionable provisions).
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Law of Lawyering, discussing Model Rule 1.2(d), poses this specific
hypothetical:
The highest court of State recently held that a certain clause in a
consumer goods contract is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
A retail store in State nevertheless insists its lawyer, L, continue to
include the clause in its contracts, on the grounds that the great
majority of consumers will not know it is unenforceable and thus will
79
comply with its terms anyway.

Hazard and Hodes concluded that this conduct is permissible under the
Model Rules, even when the clause is clearly unenforceable due to a
precedential ruling in the jurisdiction. They infer this from the drafting
80
history of the current Model Rule 1.2(d). In 1982, the Kutak Commission
proposed that Rule 1.2(d) provide:
A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent, or in the preparation of a written
instrument containing terms the lawyer knows are expressly prohibited
by law, but a lawyer may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
81
law.

The ABA House of Delegates rejected the portion of Rule 1.2(d) that
would have prohibited drafting a clearly unconscionable clause in a
contract, such as that described in a hypothetical posed by Hazard and
82
Hodes. Hazard and Hodes noted that in the 1983 Midyear Meeting, the
portion of the proposed rule prohibiting lawyers from preparing an
instrument “containing terms the lawyer knows or reasonably should
83
know are legally prohibited” was cut from the final rule. From its
elimination, Hazard and Hodes concluded that Lawyer L “could not now
be disciplined merely for including the unconscionable clause in the
84
contract.” Hazard and Hodes equivocated somewhat where the clause
“is likely to mislead customers as to their rights,” cautioning that “use of
85
the clause might be held to constitute fraud.”
As to the inclusion of clauses that have questionable validity rather
than clearly established invalidity, the professional rules are lacking even

79. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 5.12, at 5-39,
illus. 5-13 (3d ed. 2001).
80. The ABA charged the Kutak Commission in 1977 to update the laws governing lawyers. The
ABA House of Delegates debated, revised, and eventually adopted the Model Rules in August 1983.
See A Legislative History: The Development of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
1982–2013, at vii (Art Garwin ed., 2013).
81. Id. at 48.
82. Id. at 48–50.
83. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 79.
84. Id. § 5.12, at 5-40, illus. 5-13.
85. Id. Others concur that a clearly invalid clause may reach the “dishonesty” definition
articulated in Model Rule 8.4. See, e.g., Duhl, supra note 4, at 1016–17.
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86

more. In the interest of one’s client, it is permissible to include provisions
87
that test the limits of the law. Paul Carrington, in his provocative essay
Unconscionable Lawyers, suggested that lawyers for the more powerful
party in a transaction have responsibilities to consider fairness to the other
88
party. He warned, “Lawyers who write the forms are not justified in
zeal” that is “blind to consequences, and they are in serious danger of
89
becoming parties to the overreaching of their clients.” Carrington
constructed an argument, in the context of overreaching arbitration clauses,
that including invalid, oppressive clauses may constitute fraud and lawyer
90
misconduct. At the same time, he acknowledged that the existing Model
91
Code is not clear on this. He observed that codes of conduct for lawyers
from bygone eras, while more generally “scant” on guidance, prohibited
92
lawyers from engaging in “fraud or chicanery.” Carrington suggested
that the term “chicanery” might well have included drafting
“unconscionable provisions that disable parties from enforcing their
93
substantive rights.” In the modern era, on the other hand, he conceded
that under the current Model Rules only a “remote possibility” exists
94
that anyone might be disciplined. Carrington lamented the role lawyers
play in the drafting of unconscionable clauses in form contracts that
95
“disgrace our profession.”
3.

Judicial Reluctance to Employ Unconscionability to Influence
Bad Actors

The unconscionability doctrine recognizes that some contracting
behaviors and resulting oppressive terms are so undesirable that they cross
the line of enforceability. It should then follow that courts should (1) not
be a party to enforcement; (2) not protect the offending party; and (3) not
encourage such contracting in the future. Yet, unlike the contract illegality
doctrine, unconscionability is not typically applied to punish wrongdoers
or deter future behavior.
Courts typically regard unconscionability purely as an affirmative
defense, which places the burden on the defendant to plead and prove it.
96
On the other hand, whether a contract is void as against public policy

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Duhl, supra note 4, at 1016–17.
Kunz, supra note 73, at 494–95.
Carrington, supra note 4, at 361.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371–73.
Id. at 379–80.
Id. at 380.cal
Id. (discussing ABA Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 15 (1908)).
Id. at 384.
Id. at 361.
For simplification, this will be called “the illegality doctrine” in this Article.
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97

may be raised sua sponte by the court. The court’s power to raise
unenforceability on the grounds of public policy is based on the principle
that courts are guardians of the integrity of the judicial system and must
98
not become instruments of illegal contracts.
James White and Robert Summers’ treatise on the U.C.C. opined
that the U.C.C. similarly grants discretionary power to courts to raise
unconscionability sua sponte. White and Summers asserted, “Although it
would be useful for the defendant to plead unconscionability as an
affirmative defense, the words of 2-302(1) also seem to permit a court to
99
raise the issue sua sponte.” The U.C.C. Official Comments support this
position as well: “This section is intended to make it possible for the
courts to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find
100
to be unconscionable.”
Although a few courts recognize their own discretionary authority
101
102
many others disagree.
“Although
to raise unconscionability,
unconscionability can be decided as a matter of law by the court when it
is raised, when the issue is neither raised nor briefed . . . a trial court
103
should not rule on unconscionability sua sponte.” Those courts that
regard unconscionability merely as an affirmative defense reject the

97. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (1981) (“Even if neither
party’s pleading or proof reveals the contravention, the court may ordinarily inquire into it and decide
the case on the basis of it . . . .”); Farnsworth, supra note 57, § 5.1, at 8 (“Indeed, even if neither party
raises the issue, the court will do so on its own initiative and refuse enforcement if justified by the
record, at least if the contravention is serious.”).
98. Farnsworth, supra note 57, § 5.1, at 3 n.4 (citing cases).
99. White & Summers, supra note 57, § 5-3, at 220.
100. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2002). Section 2-302 gives the court a leading, rather than supportive,
role determining unconscionability. It begins, “If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable . . . .” Id. Section 2 adds further support to the
prerogative of the court to raise it “[w]hen it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable.” Id.
101. In Langemeier v. Nat’l Oats Co., Inc., 775 F.2d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 1985), the court explained,
“The plain language of subsection (1) permits the court to raise this issue sua sponte. Moreover,
subsection (2) is written in the disjunctive: ‘[w]hen it is claimed or appears to the court.’” (emphasis
omitted) (citing and quoting U.C.C. § 2-302)). See also In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 837 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1999) (recognizing that Alabama law gives courts discretion to raise unconscionability sua sponte).
102. See Neiman v. Galloway, 704 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
unconscionability is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved and that trial court should
not raise it sua sponte); see also Creighton Univ. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 4:08CV460, 2009 WL 756206,
at *3 (D. Neb. Mar. 18, 2009) (refusing to consider unconscionability where it has not been pleaded);
Southworth & McGill, P.A. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 580 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“If
appellants wished to avoid the plain provisions of the clause limiting liability, it was incumbent upon them to
plead and prove ‘unconscionability’ . . . .”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Atl. Indem. Co., 468
S.E.2d 570, 573 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“[F]ailure to plead the affirmative defense of unconscionability
. . . operates to bar its raising of this issue on appeal.”); Guaranteed Foods of Neb., Inc. v. Rison, 299
N.W.2d 507, 512 (Neb. 1980) (holding that under Nebraska law, “the issue of unconscionability must
be pleaded in order to be considered by the court”); Rozeboom v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241,
246 (S.D. 1984) (holding unconscionability must be asserted, pleaded, and proved).
103. Schlaefer v. Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 996 P.2d 745, 748 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted).
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premise that it is within judicial discretion to raise unconscionability on
their own initiative in the same manner as they might illegality. This
rejection of judicial authority diminishes unconscionability as the court’s
own “policing” doctrine.
The application of unconscionability differs from illegality in yet
another way. How courts sever an unconscionable term also limits
unconscionability’s influence on future bargaining behavior, unlike the
broader discretion courts exercise under illegality. Remedies for illegality
104
are permeated with deterrence concerns. For example, in the context of
overly broad employee noncompete clauses analyzed under the illegality
doctrine, some courts resist reforming or severing offending clauses but
instead strike the illegal clause in order to discourage overreaching by
105
dominant parties going forward. When contract clauses offend public
policy, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 184 comments
suggest that courts should not exercise discretion to partially enforce a
provision “unless it appears that [the offending party] made the agreement
106
in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.”
The Restatement continues: “[A] court will not aid a party who has taken
advantage of his dominant bargaining power to extract from the other
107
party a promise that is clearly so broad as to offend public policy.”
Harlan Blake’s influential article in the 1960s, Employee Agreements Not
108
to Compete, articulated a logic that has appealed to courts over the years.
Courts now often refuse to sever unreasonable parts of noncompete
clauses in the employment context specifically to avoid a perverse
incentive. “If severance is generally applied, employers can fashion truly
ominous covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and
enforced when the facts of a particular case are not unreasonable. This
109
smacks of having one’s employee’s cake, and eating it too.”
104. The Restatement’s Reporter’s Notes specifically caution that partial enforcement is not available to
those who act in bad faith because of “the potential incentives it will give employers to bargain in bad faith in
the future.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184 reporter’s note (1981). Likewise, the comment to
section 182 advises: “In close cases, a court will consider whether denial of recovery will deter the improper
conduct or, on the contrary, encourage persons engaging in such conduct to enter into transactions knowing
that their promises are unenforceable.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 182 cmt. b (1981).
105. Farnsworth explained that a bedrock principle of “unenforceability on grounds of public policy”
is as a “sanction to discourage undesirable conduct, either by the parties or by others.” Farnsworth,
supra note 57, § 5.1, at 2.
106. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184 cmt. b (1981).
107. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184 cmt. b (1981).
108. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 683 (1960). The
Restatement rejects a blue-lining approach, particularly when the stronger party overreaches in order to
take advantage of the weaker party and in the case of standard form contracts. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 184 cmt. b (1981).
109. Blake, supra note 108, at 683. Citing Blake’s article, the court in Valley Med. Specialists v.
Farber, 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999), struck down an overly broad noncompete clause as against public
policy and refused to rewrite it as a signal to other employers. Id. at 1286. The court opined that had it
simply rewritten the noncompete to make it reasonable: “Employers may therefore create ominous
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Deterrence goals do not guide the construction of unconscionability
remedies to the same extent that they do in illegality cases. Courts tend
to favor benign forms of severance of unconscionable terms, rather than
utilizing severance remedies to serve broader public policies beyond the
110
case at issue. The Restatement appears to support lesser remedial
applications, explaining, “the policy is not penal: unless the parties can be
restored to their precontract positions, the offending party will ordinarily be
awarded at least the reasonable value of performance rendered by
111
him.” However, while this comment may support protecting the
offending party in “ordinary” cases, it does not preclude a judge from
refusing to protect repeat players who might otherwise habitually offend.
If a stronger party usually suffers no loss beyond the effect of the
misconduct, any potential for deterrence of future misconduct is lost.

covenants, knowing that if the words are challenged, courts will modify the agreement to make it
enforceable.” Id.; see also Richard P. Rita Pers. Services Int’l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1972);
Ceramic & Metal Coatings Corp. v. Hizer, 529 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Woodward v. Cadillac
Overall Supply Co., 240 N.W.2d 710, 719 (Mich. 1976).
110. As to the remedies for unconscionability, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts comments,
“[w]here a term rather than the entire contract is unconscionable, the appropriate remedy is ordinarily
to deny effect to the unconscionable term” and its comments do not make reference to affecting future
behavior. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. g (1981); see also Farnsworth, supra note
57, § 4.28, at 594 (noting that courts generally reserve the option to strike the clause in its entirety rather
than sever it when unconscionability “infects” or “permeates” the entire clause or contract).
111. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. g (1981). In Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc.,
205 P.3d 1091, 1098–99 (Alaska 2009), the court considered but rejected an employee’s argument that if a
threshold provision in an arbitration agreement were held unconscionable the court should not enforce
any part of the arbitration clause. The court acknowledged that the effect of the ruling had implications
for the conduct of employers drafting contract provisions in the future, but stated:
We have no reason to think that Nye and other employers will ignore the precedent created by
this opinion. If in future cases similar unconscionable clauses are sought to be enforced despite
our ruling in this case, severance might not be appropriate. For the present, however, the strong
public policy favoring arbitration points to imposing a severance remedy so that arbitration
may take place.
Id. On the other hand, at least in dicta, the California Supreme Court likened unconscionability to
illegality and took note that merely severing an offending unconscionable provision has the same effect
on future behavior as an illegal one:
This reasoning applies with equal force to arbitration agreements that limit damages to be
obtained from challenging the violation of unwaivable statutory rights. An employer will not
be deterred from routinely inserting such a deliberately illegal clause into the arbitration
agreements it mandates for its employees if it knows that the worst penalty for such illegality is
the severance of the clause after the employee has litigated the matter. In that sense, the
enforcement of a form arbitration agreement containing such a clause drafted in bad faith
would be condoning, or at least not discouraging, an illegal scheme, and severance would be
disfavored unless it were for some other reason in the interests of justice.
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 697 n.13 (Cal. 2000).

O - Beh_17 (EGK) (1) (Do Not Delete)

1032

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/21/2015 12:07 AM

[Vol. 66:1011

II. Resuscitating Unconscionability
This Part envisions a more robust and relevant unconscionability
doctrine. First, it reminds the reader that this stronger version of
unconscionability does exist, as common law judges have shown in
arbitration cases. It then considers a variety of suggestions to invigorate
unconscionability as a safeguard against unfair bargaining.
A. Evidence That Unconscionability Is Not Dead
Unconscionability reveals its stronger side in the back and forth
judicial conversation about arbitration between the U.S. Supreme Court
112
and lower courts. Unconscionability’s resilience in arbitration cases is
in part attributed to a judicial awakening that the “unconscionability
doctrine may be one of the judiciary’s only remaining tools for protection
113
of individuals and small businesses” against “escalating aggressiveness in
114
the drafting of arbitration agreements.” Susan Randall observed that in
the arbitration context, unconscionability was uncharacteristically
115
fortified. Randall found that the application of unconscionability to
arbitration cases in the current era departs from the norm in three ways:
First, judges find unconscionability more often in the arbitration cases.
Second, judges find specific provisions within arbitration clauses, such as
choice of law, forum selection, and damage limitations, unconscionable
more often than when these same provisions are found within nonarbitration provisions of the contract. Finally, some judges express open
116
hostility toward arbitration in their judicial opinions, perhaps as a
signaling device to lawmakers.
112. See generally Knapp, Blowing the Whistle, supra note 1, at 613; Stempel, supra note 6, at 765–66;
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 Buff.
L. Rev. 185, 188 (2004). Arbitration, perceived as a lower cost, more expedient, more flexible, and
generally superior dispute resolution regime compared to litigation, has long been favored by merchants.
However, courts have approached arbitration agreements with suspicion, perceived by some as overt
hostility, because of the litigation safeguards surrendered in arbitration. See Stempel, supra note 6, at
771. The Federal Arbitration Act, enacted in 1925, intended to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements . . . and to place [them] on the same footing as other contracts.” Randall, supra
note 112, at 185 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000)). Since then, the
Supreme Court has advanced an increasingly pro-arbitration stance that has allowed wide swaths of the
marketplace to essentially opt out of the public legal system to one of private adjudication.
113. Randall, supra note 112, at 189.
114. Id. at 196; see also Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey, supra note 1, at 319–20, 337–38;
Stempel, supra note 6, at 776–800 (chronicling the “pro-arbitration regime” advanced in Supreme Court
decisions over the past twenty-plus years and the energized reaction of lower court judges).
115. Randall, supra note 112, at 185–86.
116. Id. Knapp has observed similarly:
[T]he burgeoning application of the FAA triggered a corresponding expansion in the attention
paid by state courts (and lower federal courts as well) to the doctrine of unconscionability.
Unable to challenge directly the Supreme Court’s insistence on a strong preference for
arbitration, parties desiring to avoid being forced to submit to arbitration increasingly mounted
unconscionability attacks on arbitration clauses, and with increasing success.
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Mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer contracts raise
formation, fairness, and substance issues that are the bread and butter of
contract law; issues that we have long entrusted to common law judges.
Perhaps this perceived encroachment by federal lawmakers on common
law courts explains the groundswell of pushback against the “slanted pro117
arbitration doctrinal straightjacket fashioned by Supreme Court.”
Perhaps, too, the resurgence of unconscionability reveals that, at least with
regard to arbitration, judges have reached a tipping point.
It remains to be seen whether unconscionability will be a formidable
rear guard action in the developing law of arbitration. The Supreme Court’s
118
pro-arbitration decisions continue unabated. Nevertheless, California
courts have doggedly preserved at least some of unconscionability’s viability
119
in arbitration cases. Knapp has applauded the judicial pushback:
Our survey of the courts at work in the unconscionability decisions
reveals to me neither a lawless mob armed with pitchforks and torches,
storming the castle of federal supremacy, nor a cabal of crafty and
conniving functionaries, out to subvert established authority. Rather I
see merely a loose collection of public servants, united only by their
zeal to preserve, protect, and defend the rights of those who appear
before them. By invoking the rhetoric of unconscionability, these
judges are not merely acting tactically in a game of legal chess—
although they may be doing that as well—they are sending a message,
not just to the U.S. Supreme Court, but to the other officials and
120
institutions that collectively make up our legal system.

Even if unconscionability ultimately fails to survive as a consumer defense
in arbitration cases, some believe that the lower court decisions herald a
new era for a reinvigorated unconscionability doctrine generally. Knapp,
reviewing unconscionability cases outside of arbitration, optimistically
reported “a possibly wider and more significant role for the concept of
121
unconscionability as the new century unfolds.” Stempel drew a similarly
optimistic conclusion from the arbitration cases:

Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey, supra note 1, at 317 (citations omitted).
117. Stempel, supra note 6, at 802.
118. See, e.g., Amer. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) (holding that
arbitration provision waiving class actions was not invalid under a judicially created “effective
vindication” doctrine); AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2010) (holding that
FAA preempts California’s judicial rule regarding the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in
consumer contract).
119. See Cynthia Galvez, Fancy Footwork: California Narrowly Applies U.S. Supreme Court FAA
Precedent; Upholds State Law Unconscionability as a Ground for Refusing to Enforce Arbitration Agreement,
Alternatives to High Cost Litig. (Int’l Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, New York, N.Y.),
Jan. 2014, at 10 (reporting on Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2013), in which the
California Supreme Court allowed a narrowly crafted unconscionability defense against compelled
arbitration in the employment context to proceed).
120. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle, supra note 1, at 628.
121. Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey, supra note 1, at 326 (reviewing cases in sales and leases,
service contracts, domestic relations, real estate, and consumer credit and lending).
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[T]he answer of many courts to the new twenty-first century problem
of arbitrability has been the rediscovery and reinvigoration of a venerable
doctrine that deserves greater respect and more frequent use across the
board. . . . The arbitration-unconscionability experience suggests that a
relatively less constrained version of the unconscionability norm should
continue to play a role in contract construction, for both arbitration
122
terms and other contract provisions.

The stronger form of unconscionability revealed in the arbitration cases
suggests that unconscionability can serve as a useful judicial policing
123
mechanism in the consumer context.
B. Fine-Tuning Unconscionability
This Subpart discusses suggestions that would give unconscionability
a more meaningful policing role in the sphere of consumer contracts.
While some proposals to strengthen unconscionability have urged radical
overhaul, others involve only judicial “fine-tuning” of unconscionability
in ways that do not do violence to the U.C.C.’s or Restatement’s
construction of unconscionability. The suggestions considered here share
the dual objectives of being more useful in individual cases and deterring
unconscionability in future contracts. Moreover, most of these suggestions
offer ways to reconceive the unconscionability doctrine that are within
the grasp of judges.
1.

Expanding Remedies

A number of scholars have argued that unconscionability should
have an affirmative application, and not be viewed as merely defensive.
Their suggestions widely range from recognizing unconscionability as a
tort to simply recognizing it as a basis in contract to affirmatively seek
restitution.
The boldest suggestion to reinvigorate unconscionability is to
124
establish a parallel tort-based claim. Proponents of unconscionability as
a tort regard tort-based compensatory and punitive damages as more apt
125
given the nature of unconscionability. Furthermore, proponents of
recognizing a tort of unconscionability assert that it is appropriate to
impose tort remedies in order to influence public policy and promote

122. Stempel, supra note 6, at 860.
123. See Smith, supra note 52, at 1110–11 (calling for judicially revised constructions of the
objective theory of assent and the duty to read rule in the analysis of adhesionary contracts).
124. Establishing new torts is within the domain of the common law. See Donald B. King, The Tort
of Unconscionability: A New Tort for New Times, 23 St. Louis U. L.J. 97, 97 (1979).
125. See Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural Unconscionability,
34 Cumb. L. Rev. 11, 14 (2003) (urging recognition of a new tort focused on procedural unconscionability);
King, supra note 124, at 113 (arguing that unconscionability represents a legal wrong that courts should
recognize in tort); Gaddy Wells, Note, The Doctrine of Unconscionability: A Sword As Well As a Shield,
29 Baylor L. Rev. 309, 313 (1977) (recognizing a new tort).
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126

“consumer justice.” They perceive the wrongfulness of unconscionable
behavior as a larger social harm that extends beyond the two parties to
the contract. In the view of one scholar, procedural unconscionability in
particular should be treated as a tort because it threatens our collective
buy-in to principles of contract generally: “Unconscionable contract
formation is an affront to the logic of a legal system that assumes
rationality in the contract-formation process and potentially undermines
127
our system of contract enforcement as a whole.” A desire to prevent
these wider harms to the foundation of contract law therefore justifies
unconscionability as a tort:
A remedy at law is needed, in addition to the equitable remedies
currently available, to deter the repeat offender and to preserve the
sanctity of the contracting process. . . .
. . . Treating procedural unconscionability as potentially actionable
[in tort] recognizes that overreaching can sometimes do more than
disturb the balance of the relationship between the parties. A legal
cause of action for procedural unconscionability would recognize that
overreaching can inflict actual damage on the victim and on society’s
128
interest in the contracting process.

Unconscionability as tort heightens attention on the social harm that
unconscionable contractors cause beyond the damage inflicted upon the
other party.
Stopping short of tort-like conceptualizations, others have urged that
courts should recognize an affirmative, as well as defensive, posture for
unconscionability claims, thus providing litigants with a wider range of
contract remedies. Prince pointed out that the “artificial” distinction
courts make between a defensive and offensive use of unconscionability
illogically fails to compensate for losses caused by the fulfillment of an
129
unconscionable contract. Prince’s position has been adopted by a few

126. See King, supra note 124, at 124–25.
127. Marrow, supra note 125, at 15. Paul Bennett Marrow explained:
Unconscionable conduct in the negotiation process should be deterred. Current statutory
attempts to curb unconscionable activity fall short of providing the deterrence that is needed.
Remedies at law, not equity, accomplish deterrence. The tort that this article proposes,
Consequential Procedural Unconscionability, provides an instrument for deterrence. Without
this tort, the tortfeasor has no reason to refrain from exploiting the benefits available
through the use of procedurally unconscionable strategies and tactics.
Id. In a subsequent article, Marrow argued that unconscionability in the consumer context should be
focused solely on the impact the contracting behavior has on public policy implications beyond the
contracting parties. See Paul Bennett Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of
Unconscionability, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev. 187, 189 (2005).
128. Marrow, supra note 125, at 16. White and Summers also explored the desirability of awarding
punitive damages for the sake of deterrence when a pattern of unconscionability exists. They concluded,
“At least one of us is hesitant to turn loose the punitive damage dogs. After all, this is a commercial, not a
consumer, code.” White & Summers, supra note 57, § 5–8, at 239.
129. Prince, supra note 59, at 548. Prince wrote:
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courts that allow affirmative and offensive uses of unconscionability
130
under the existing doctrine. At the very least, equitable remedies
131
including restitution are warranted.
Expanding remedies by allowing prevailing defendants to recover
attorney’s fees also has appeal because it serves multiple desirable
132
goals. Granting courts discretion to award attorney’s fees to victims of
unconscionability who successfully defend a lawsuit acknowledges:
(1) the injury victim suffered in defending and vindicating her rights
against a wrongdoer; (2) the benefits bestowed on nonparties as a result
of having a court declare a contractual term in a standard contract
unconscionable; and (3) the deterrence effects an award might have on
future unconscionable contracting. Attorney’s fees are already common
in many consumer protection statutes, where unconscionable contracting
133
is often regulated for precisely these reasons. However, absent a statute
authorizing an award of fees, judicial adherence to the American Rule
makes it unlikely a court will award attorney’s fees in a contractual
134
unconscionability case.
Stephen Friedman complained that the lesser nonenforcement
remedy is inadequate because it fails to adequately capture actual losses
suffered by defendants as a result of unconscionability and because the
want of remedies creates perverse incentives for repeat actors. Friedman
135
justified departure from the American Rule because a finding of

An affirmative recovery should be allowed, however, in at least two situations: when the
operation of the unconscionable clause has already caused a loss to the offended party at
the time of trial and justifies restitution and when striking an unconscionable provision gives
the party an avenue for recovery based on the remainder of the contract.
Id.
130. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2010);
Eva v. Midwest Nat’l Mortg. Banc, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 862, 895–96 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
131. See White & Summers, supra note 57, § 5–8, at 237–38.
132. Stephen E. Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy for
Contractual Overreaching, 44 Ga. L. Rev. 317, 319 (2010).
133. For example, state statutes addressing unfair and deceptive trade practices typically, but not
always, allow for recovery of attorney’s fees. See Carolyn L. Carter, Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr.,
Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices Statutes (Feb. 2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf.
134. Under the so-called English Rule, a prevailing party is awarded attorney’s fees, while under
the American Rule, fee shifting is not the norm. See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on
Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1567 (1993) (tracing the
history of both rules). The American Rule has well-established exceptions. If a contract provides for attorney
fees, it will be enforced. Id. at 1578. Other well-established exceptions include the common fund exception
and the substantial benefit doctrines, which focus on the benefits the litigation has bestowed on nonlitigants;
and the contempt and bad faith exceptions, which each focus on the conduct of the losing party in the course
of the litigation. Id. at 1579–87. Statutory exceptions to the American Rule abound: “The major purpose of
state fee-shifting legislation is to compensate the prevailing plaintiff, promote public interest litigation,
punish or deter the losing party for misconduct, or prevent abuse of the judicial system.” Id. at 1588.
135. Historical and comparative accounts of the so-called American Rule and English Rule suggest
that numerous judicial and statutory exceptions blur the distinctions in large part. See id. at 1570–90;
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unconscionability reveals “that the overreaching party has abused a
privileged position” and that awarding attorney’s fees to the victim of
unconscionability “would . . . respect unconscionability’s particular
136
Friedman argued that litigation involving
nature and heritage.”
standardized contracting justifies an attorney’s fees award because the
award accurately captures the real damage inflicted upon the victim of
the unconscionable contract. He explained that challenging provisions
within standardized forms come with unique litigation burdens and
137
constitute a tort-like wrong against consumers. He noted that allowing
courts discretion to award attorney’s fees to consumers has an added
benefit as a sanction “sufficient to focus the attention of sellers and their
lawyers” on the fairness of standardized forms so as to avoid
138
unconscionability. Friedman therefore proposed that a few bold state
legislatures might stimulate other states to amend their versions of U.C.C.
139
section 2-302 to expressly provide for such an award.
Others scholars have proposed altering the burdens of proof required
to establish unconscionability, particularly in the standard consumer
contract context. As an affirmative defense, courts typically place the
140
burden to plead and prove unconscionability on the defendant. Yet,
many scholars have observed that standard form contracts, although
extraordinarily common, defy contract law’s fundamental assumption
that contracts are based on mutual bargaining and assent. This
assumption justifies the powerful freedom of contract principles that
141
make unconscionability difficult to prove. Some scholars suggest that a
more principled approach to unconscionability in standard form contracting
John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 9, 27–31 (1984). Alaska has rejected the American Rule in favor of “a variation of
the ‘English Rule.’” See Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the Impact
of Alaska’s English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 Alaska L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2012).
136. Friedman, supra note 132, at 319.
137. Friedman explained that consumers who establish unconscionability expended attorney fees
directly and discretely caused by the unconscionability. He likened the unconscionable provision to a
breach of warranty and the expense to establish unconscionability as a direct damage. Id. at 361–63. He
characterized unconscionability as “wrong against that consumer,” for which a direct remedy is
warranted. Id. at 363.
138. Id. at 365–66.
139. Id. at 371 (“All that is necessary is for a few state legislatures to authorize attorney’s fees to
get the ball rolling.”). Arizona and Hawaii allow the prevailing party in contract actions to recover
attorney’s fees. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-341.01 (LexisNexis 2014) (“In any contested action arising out of
a contract, express or implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees.”);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14 (2014) (“In all the courts, in all actions in the nature of assumpsit and in all
actions on a promissory note or other contract in writing that provides for an attorney’s fee, there shall
be taxed as attorney’s fees, to be paid by the losing party . . . .”).
140. See, e.g., Southworth & McGill, P.A., v. S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 580 So. 2d 628, 630–31 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing cases for proposition that unconscionability is an affirmative defense that
must be pleaded and proved).
141. See generally 1 Farnsworth, supra note 57, at 556–72 (discussing the judicial difficulties in
utilizing traditional contract doctrines to respond to the issues raised by standardized contract).
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would place a burden on a dominant party to defend boilerplate provisions
when attacked as unconscionable.
Refining the burdens of proof and production within the existing
doctrine of unconscionability recognizes that standard boilerplate terms
142
are not the product of traditional bargaining and equality. In the context
of adhesionary standardized contracts, Russell Korobkin observed that
143
market pressure will not produce efficiency as to nonsalient terms.
Efficient terms are beneficial, however. Korobkin explained that sellers
have an incentive to insert nonsalient terms in form contracts that are not
144
efficient, but that instead favor themselves over the buyers. James Gibson,
building on Korobkin’s contributions, suggested the following refinement
to courts’ methodology for finding unconscionability:
First, as always, the consumer must prove procedural unconscionability
by showing that the disputed term was not salient—but this inquiry
should take into account emerging empirical evidence and the full
context of the overall transaction. Second, if the consumer satisfies this
burden, then the burden on the issue of substantive unconscionability
shifts to the seller, who must show that the term was efficient. Failure
145
to do so means the term is unenforceable.

Notably, neither the Restatement nor the U.C.C. assigns any particular
evidentiary burdens to either party, instead placing an equal responsibility
on each party to make its case. The U.C.C. provides merely that “[w]hen
it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence . . . to aid the court in making the
146
determination.” The Restatement leaves the court squarely in charge
of how evidence about unconscionability should emerge, speaking only

142. Russell Korobkin, although favoring a “market and government institutions” approach to designing
the nonsalient, boilerplate terms, has suggested that to the extent unconscionability remains the domain of
judges, the inquiry and burdens of establishing unconscionability should be refined to promote efficiency
principles. He proposed that courts analyze unconscionability in the standard form contract area as follows:
(1) “procedural unconscionability” analysis should be motivated by an inquiry into a term’s
salience, (2) “substantive unconscionability” determinations should depend on whether
terms are more costly to buyers than they are beneficial to sellers ex ante, (3) courts should
require buyers to meet an exacting burden of proof before finding a term unconscionable
under this criterion, and (4) courts should liberally refuse to enforce terms found
unconscionable under this standard, and even refuse to enforce entire contracts on some
occasions, in order to provide an incentive to sellers to draft efficient form contract terms ex
ante when the market fails to provide such an incentive.
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1203, 1208 (2003).
143. Korobkin explained that these are the terms within standard contracts that do not capture a buyer’s
limited attention or concern because they are regarded as of low probability or significance to the
transaction. Id. at 1234–36.
144. Id. at 1243–44.
145. James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 161, 223–24 (2013).
146. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (2002).
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of the court’s prerogative to “refuse” enforcement in some form or
147
another. Thus, the unconscionability doctrine grants a court the authority
to construct a framework to consider unconscionability in the context of
the case before it. Because adhesionary contracts challenge common
notions of contractual assent, courts might justifiably demand that the
drafter of a problematic standardized term first show that it was a
148
commercially reasonable term.
2.

A Judicial Attitudinal Adjustment

Others scholars have boldly called for a judicial attitudinal
adjustment toward the unconscionability doctrine. This attitude
adjustment derives from an acknowledgment that unconscionability is
not a rigid rule-based doctrine but a standards-based doctrine vested in
the discretion of the court. Rather than evoking fear of unconscionability
as a rule devoid of principle, judges should embrace unconscionability’s
149
flexibility as a necessary counterweight to mindless formalism and rigidity.
Unconscionability is a judicial means to drill deep into the soul of a contract
and test its realness rather than its form.
An early voice in unconscionability scholarship, M.P. Ellinghaus,
responded to Leff’s critique of unconscionability’s vagaries in In Defense of
150
Unconscionability, where he celebrated unconscionability’s “wooliness.”
Ellinghaus characterized Leff and other critics as mistaken with respect to
unconscionability’s fundamental function in contract law. In his view,
Leff’s problem was that he was characterizing unconscionability as a
meaningless and unprincipled rule, when in fact, unconscionability
existed as one of contract law’s “residual categories,” occupying that
stage with doctrines of necessary vagueness such as “‘reasonableness,’ ‘due
151
care,’ and ‘good faith.’” Ellinghaus argued that unconscionability was
not a rule that was “abstract” to the point of “meaninglessness” as critics
152
complained, but instead was not a rule at all. Rather, it was a
153
“standard” that was “essential to the well-being” of contract law itself.
He placed his faith in courts to employ unconscionability prudently. To
Leff, he responded: “Most important of all, such an overemphasis [on
definitional failure] is calculated to discourage the courts from discharging
the function of reasoned and creative exegesis and implementation which
154
Section 2-302 so obviously (because necessarily) entrusts to them.”

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981).
See Smith, supra note 52, at 1110–11.
See Stempel, supra note 6, at 859.
M. P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale L.J. 757, 795 (1969).
Id. at 759.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 757, 759.
Id. at 761.
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Ellinghuas placed extraordinary confidence in the common law to recognize
an evolving standard: “[U]nconscionability is a ‘standard’ which awaits,
155
and is designed to encourage, organic development by the courts.” He
156
concluded, “[W]e cannot do without such regrettably vague standards.”
Amy Schmitz, like Ellinghaus some forty years before, also defended
unconscionability as encapsulating a norm that succeeds precisely because
of its flexibility. She argued that unconscionability defies rigid formalism
157
in order to ensure contract law remains true to “core human values.” In
defense of unconscionability, she writes:
Unconscionability should retain its flexibility and generality due to its
philosophical and historical underpinnings. Fairness standards underlying
unconscionability flow from natural and generalized norms of civil
behavior deemed necessary to societal survival. These behavioral norms,
therefore, should drive unconscionability’s flexible application despite a
158
modern resurgence of classical rigidity and resistance to fairness review.

She urged judges to further unleash the doctrine and “resist formalist
trends and use unconscionability as a safety net to catch cases of contractual
159
unfairness that slip through more formulaic contract defenses.”
One way to implement this attitudinal adjustment is to recognize
that unconscionability shares the objectives of illegality in contract law
and judges possess a similar guardian function. These adjustments
require only a willing judge. The language of the Restatement and the
U.C.C. already entrusts unconscionability to the judge in the first
instance, along the lines of illegality. U.C.C. Section 2-302(1) begins not
with a requirement that a party raise unconscionability, but with the
judge finding it: “If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
160
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract.” Section 2-302(2)
provides further support to the assertion that the oversight of
unconscionability is a judicial responsibility. “When it is claimed or
appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to

155. Id. at 795.
156. Id. at 815.
157. Schmitz, supra note 3, at 73. Schmitz explains that the doctrine’s flexibility enables judges to
test the core principle of consent to contract, which formulaic rules of formation might otherwise miss:
Common law unconscionability, thus, has evolved in the shadows of a rigid rule of law that
emphasized clear contract enforcement. This flexible doctrine has survived despite
dominance of formalism and dogma denouncing inquiry into the fairness of exchange. It
also has remained flexible in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), despite proposals for
its containment. Indeed, it continues to allow courts to grant relief from contracts that
appear consensual but are not in fact the products of real choice.
Id. at 84.
158. Id. at 102.
159. Id.
160. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2012).
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present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid
161
the court in making the determination.” Thus, if unconscionability
appears to the court, it may raise the issue, and then the litigants have the
supporting role of aiding the court in its decision. As a doctrine steeped
in public policy and intended as a judicial tool to root out the evil results
of naughty bargaining, unconscionability naturally seems a close relative
to illegality. As a result, judges should view raising unconscionability as a
judicial responsibility, rather than limiting it to an affirmative defense
that must be raised by a party. Judges can and should raise it sua sponte,
lest the judiciary become complicit in allowing unconscionable results.
Judges might also draw other lessons from illegality and, when
appropriate, fashion a remedy that sanctions dominant actors to deter
unconscionable contracting. As Korobkin explained, once courts determine
that a seller imposed an unconscionable term, mere “reformation
remedy . . . provides no incentive for sellers to resist the market pressure
to provide low-quality non-salient form terms even when low-quality
162
terms are inefficient.” Since “[m]ost buyers will abide by the form term
163
rather than challenge it, giving the seller a windfall,”
[i]n the unusual case that the term is challenged and found
unconscionable by a court, the seller is no worse off than it would have
been if it had provided an efficient term initially. . . . [U]nconscionable
terms will be avoided only when courts intercede in private contracting
arrangements and invalidate terms. . . .

...
The severability doctrine does not require deference to parties who
knowingly include illegal terms in their contracts, however. As one
court has observed, to do so would only encourage overreaching by
drafting parties. This reasoning applies with even greater force to
unconscionability, because courts are much more poorly suited to
determine whether or not a term is efficient than they are to determine
whether a term is illegal. In light of this, and especially if deference is
given to seller-drafted terms that are not clearly inefficient, it is important
for courts to provide sellers with the maximum incentive not only to
attempt to draft efficient non-salient form terms, but also to invest time
and resources in doing so.
Providing such an incentive requires courts, on a finding of
unconscionability, to severely limit enforcement of the contract in
question to deter other sellers from similar bad faith or carelessness.
Put in different terms, courts should recognize a right of buyers to be
free of unconscionable contracting behavior, and this right should be
164
protected with a “property rule” rather than a “liability rule.”

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. § 2-302(2) (emphasis added).
Korobkin, supra note 142, at 1286.
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1286–89.
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Courts may not be able to legislate unconscionability into oblivion, but at
the least, they can exercise their discretion to promote conscionable
contracting in the marketplace.
3.

The Conscience of a Lawyer

As contracts teachers, we prepare students to know and embrace the
normative conventions of contract law in practice. Even if one concedes
that contract law’s unconscionability doctrine has little heft and adds
little to contract litigation, it would still deserve its enduring place in
first-year contracts because it forces students to think about bargaining
disparity and fairness. Unconscionability allows students, who one day will
represent the powerful, to consider their ethical and moral responsibility
to weaker parties. Yet, after the first-year class, in the real world of
lawyering, unconscionability currently misses its hortatory potential as well.
Transactional practitioners will find little in the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility to guide them as they navigate issues of
fairness and power. Christina Kunz called the current Model Rules
“thin” in their guidance to transactional lawyers who are considering
limits of using a client’s power to exact favorable terms from weaker or
unsophisticated parties.
[She] invites practicing lawyers, judges, and ethics scholars to look
more closely at transactional ethics, in order to (1) enhance the legal
profession’s awareness of ethical pitfalls in “too-sharp” drafting
practices, (2) bring ethics rules to bear on existing drafting practices
that violate the rules, and (3) further develop transactional ethics into a
more robust field that is better able to curb the ethical abuses in
165
drafting and negotiation.

At the very least, lawyers asked to draft unconscionable or possibly
166
unconscionable terms owe duties of wise counsel to their clients. Some
scholars observe that client counseling must go beyond simplistically
informing clients that they can likely “get away with it.” They urge that
counseling about unconscionability be “textured,” in order to provide
clients with a fuller understanding of the possible negative ramifications
167
of expedient overreaching on them and on justice more generally. Going
one step further than client counseling, some scholars have called for
strengthening the disclosure obligations that lawyers have to the other
168
party, at least as to the inclusion of unquestionably unconscionable terms.
Some who wrestle with the ethical issues related to the imbalance of
power in transactional practice urge lawyers to develop a more complex
ethical dimension to their own professional identity that transcends their

165.
166.
167.
168.

Kunz, supra note 73, at 511.
Id. at 502–04.
Carrington, supra note 4, at 372; Kunz, supra note 73, 502–04; Schmitz, supra note 70, at 875–76.
Duhl, supra note 4, at 1012 (calling for conspicuous disclosure of invalid provisions).
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representation of one client in one transaction. For example, Schmitz,
critiquing arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, encourages lawyers
to consider power imbalance as part of their ethical responsibilities:
Attorneys representing companies in drafting or enforcing consumer
arbitration clauses should therefore remain committed to justice and
ethical considerations that transcend stark professional conduct rules.
This means that they should go beyond rote assumptions of
arbitration’s benefits to consider the real risks and impacts of onerous
arbitration provisions. It also means that they should refuse to draft
provisions that, upon reflection, appear likely to conceal companies’
illegal conduct or squelch consumers’ procedural and substantive
169
rights.

She explains that this “fairness of means and objectives” should be part
of the transactional lawyer’s professional responsibility because, unlike
170
litigation, there is no third-party referee to curb contracting abuses.
Deborah Rhode, an outspoken critic of current ethical training of
lawyers, labeled our current approach as teaching “legal ethics without
171
the ethics.” The narrow focus law schools place on the rules concerning
lawyer discipline “leave future practitioners without the foundations for
172
reflective judgment.” Indeed, the current Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility have been criticized as fixating on the floor of minimum
173
rule compliance and ignoring “the broadly moral altogether.” Defining
professionalism only as conformance to the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility lowers ethical conduct to the minimum expectations of
conduct to avoid discipline rather than embracing professionalism as
embodiment of a richly complex and nuanced professional identity.
The Carnegie Foundation’s heralded study, Educating Lawyers,
articulated legal education’s responsibility to invest in cultivating in
student character, integrity, and a broader view of ethics than mere rule
174
compliance. Educating Lawyers called on law schools to go beyond
merely “the law of lawyering” and to allow students to consider “the
substantive ends of law, the identity and role of lawyers, and questions of
equity and purpose” and to explore “questions of both competence and
175
responsibility to the client and to the legal system.” Therefore, even if
unconscionability proved itself only a withered, atrophied appendage of
contract law, it still deserves its place in first-year contracts.
Unconscionability has proven itself a useful springboard in a first-year
169. Schmitz, supra note 70, at 877.
170. Id. at 850.
171. Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity is the Answer, What is the Question?, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 333,
340 (2003).
172. Id.
173. Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, The Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a
Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 411, 421 (2005).
174. William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers 145–61 (2007).
175. Id. at 147.
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contracts class for discussing that rich sense of integrity and professional
identity teachers aim to cultivate.

Conclusion
“‘[U]nconscionability’ is a residual category of shifting content and
176
expansible nature.” Rather than shrink from its flexible nature, its
champions, Knapp among them, have urged judges to accept and use the
latitude it provides them wisely, to promote fairness and justice in
177
contracting. This Article explores suggestions advanced by several
contract scholars to judicially fine-tune the unconscionability doctrine in
order to enable the doctrine to fulfill its purpose. Most of these are
within the grasp of a common law judge. For example, to make
unconscionability more vital and robust, more courts might follow those
few courts that entertain unconscionability as an affirmative claim that
can be brought by a victim, as well as an affirmative defense. At the very
least, in appropriate cases, courts should consider a broader range of
equitable remedies in addition to nonenforcement, and particularly allow
declaratory relief and restitution. Expanding the range of remedies
afforded to victims recognizes that unconscionability can cause financial
harm that cannot be adequately compensated by mere nonenforcement.
The exposure to an award of damages, even simple restitution or
attorney’s fees, may be needed when the unconscionable term has caused
the victim to incur loss. Moreover, the threat of real damages may also
deter unconscionable actors.
Next, courts should acknowledge that unconscionability is close kin
to illegality. Like other forms of illegality, unconscionable contracts,
particularly adhesionary form contracts, have negative impacts beyond
the parties. Pervasive unconscionability undermines basic principles of
contract law and threatens social order. Therefore, courts should fashion
remedies in order to deter future unconscionability. And courts should
accept that the U.C.C. and the Restatement expressly empower a court
to raise unconscionability sua sponte, precisely so that the court does not
become an instrument of unconscionability.
The legal profession might well consider how to dissuade lawyers
from participating in unconscionable contracting. Unconscionability
doctrine is intended to identify and remedy bargaining abuse that results
in grossly unfair contracts, and it does not serve the reputation of the
legal profession to allow lawyers to be an instrument of unconscionability.
176. Ellinghaus, supra note 150, at 814.
177. Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey, supra note 1, at 338 (calling unconscionability “a means of
tempering economic efficiency with social justice, and moral decency”); Stempel, supra note 6, at 860
(approving the usefulness of a “a relatively less constrained version of the unconscionability norm”);
Schmitz, supra note 3, at 117 (urging courts to “resist the pull of contract formalism and rekindle
unconscionability’s flexibility in order to allow the doctrine to serve its safety net function”).
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At the very least, when a contract has the stench of unconscionability,
lawyers owe their own clients wise, cautious, and considered counsel.
Law schools are charged with helping students to cultivate a worthy
professional identity rather than teaching them to reside at the ethical
bottom of the profession. Professional identity is not defined by minimal
ethical rules, but by a richly nuanced and animated sense of integrity.
Lawyers of integrity understand the larger responsibilities of their
profession both to society and to others.
Most importantly, courts must embrace unconscionability for the
flexible standard that it was intended to be, and to recognize it as a
doctrine intended to police and define the essence of bargaining fairness.
The arbitration cases reveal that unconscionability can be a robust
common law doctrine that insists upon contracting fairness and justice.
The unconscionability doctrine should not be perceived as so vague and
plastic that it endangers contract law; instead, unconscionability should
be recognized as a standard of essential contracting fairness that has
been entrusted to the common law of contracts.
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